In Johnson v. State, 157 Fla. 685, 694, 27 So. 2d 276, 281 (1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 799, 67 p. Ct. 491, 91 L. Ed. 683 (1947), this Court held that courts cannot consider the sufficiency, legality or character of evidence submitted to a grand jury.

Johnson clarified whether the trial court denied the defendant due process when it rejected his request to suppress the information on the basis of insufficient evidence. So far, Florida has not directly addressed the specific issues raised when the state makes false statements to the grand jury or determines before trial that the charge on which an accused is to be tried is based on perjury testimony. However, federal courts as well as other regional courts have addressed these issues. Finally, Anderson alleges that the trial court wrongly rejected the defense attorney`s request to later inform the jury of the aid because his defense theory was that Beasley, not himself, murdered Grantham. He argues that he was only an accomplice and that the jury should have been ordered to acquit him if he had concluded that the evidence supporting his theory of complicity after the crime raised reasonable doubts as to his guilt for the first-degree murder. We reject this claim because the state did not accuse Anderson of aiding and abetting after the fact, and that aiding and abetting in retrospect is not a lesser crime of premeditated murder. Moreover, subsequent aid does not constitute a legal defence. For these reasons, Anderson was not entitled to a jury instruction on this offense. Palm trees against the state, 397 Sun. 2d 648, 652 (Fla.), certificate refused, 454 U.S.

882, 102 S. Ct. 369, 70 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1981). The Supreme Court required the same type of procedural guarantee to protect the constitutional rights of a defendant in the death penalty case boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 pp.

Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969). In the Boykin case, a jury sentenced the accused to death after the accused pleaded guilty to the knowingly and wilful nature of the plea without a judicial inquiry. The Court`s analysis focused on the disastrous consequences of admitting guilt and notions of judicial efficiency and economy: in this case, the defense suggested that Beasley had changed his story after obtaining his agreement. Since Beasley made his July 1 statement to Agent Velboom prior to the July 24 agreement, Velboom`s testimony was not hearsay and was duly admitted. In contrast, the trial court erred in admitting Velboom`s testimony about Beasley`s August 20 testimony because it was made after the plea agreement when the alleged motive for the falsification *93 appeared. Jackson, 498 Sun. 2d to 910; Quiles, 523 Sun. 2d to 1263.

However, given the record as a whole, we are satisfied that in this case “there is no reasonable possibility that [this] error contributed to the conviction.” State vs. DiGuilio, 491 Sun. 2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986). [1] We are responsible. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. Similarly, in People v. Pelchat, 62 N.Y.2d 97, 464 N.E.2d 447, 476 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1984), the Court of Appeal quashed the defendant`s conviction, even though it was based on his guilty plea.

The only evidence linking Pelchat to the crime was the testimony of a police officer before the grand jury, who admitted to a prosecutor before the plea that he was wrong and that the testimony was false. In these circumstances, the court held that the prosecutor was required to disclose the confession to the court and obtain its authorization to convict the defendant again. Id. at 106, 464 N.E.2d at 452, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 84. See also Escobar v. Superior Court, 155 Ariz. 298, 301, 746 pp. 2d 39, 42 (App. 1987) (The prosecutor in the child abuse case knew that the police detective`s substantive statements regarding the nature, extent and severity of the burns inflicted on the child were erroneous and that the prosecutor should have informed the court and the grand jury); State v Reese, 91 N.M. 76, 79, 570 P.2d 614, 617 (Ct.App.

1977) (the accused`s conviction was quashed because the prosecutor had knowingly submitted to a grand jury the false testimony of an officer regarding the issue of the accused`s implied possession of the drugs of which he was accused). Anderson refused to allow defense counsel to call witnesses on his behalf during the sentencing period. The defense attorney simply presented the information accusing Beasley, Anderson`s girlfriend, of third-degree murder to show that Anderson was being treated more harshly than Beasley. The jury recommended the death penalty by eleven votes to one.