However, it is no exaggeration that Germany`s initiative towards the EEC must also be seen in the context of the German principle of federal loyalty. I would say that it is no coincidence that, as I will show in Chapter 2, loyalty to the Confederation, although not expressly provided for in the German Basic Law, was first applied by the German Constitutional Court in the early 1950s.6 Indeed, as I will also show in Chapter 2, the loyalty of the Union is similar to both pacta sunt servanda and federal fidelity. The obligation of the Member States, under Article 344 TFEU, `not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaties to a method of settlement other than that provided for by the Treaties` is a specific requirement of the general duty of loyalty laid down in Article 4(4) of the Treaty. 3 TEU.43 In mox plant, following the Commission`s allegation that Ireland had failed to fulfil its obligation to cooperate under the former Article 10 EC by initiating arbitration proceedings under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) instead of referring the matter to the ECJ, the Court held that AG Geelhoed in Case C-304/02 Commission v France (Fisheries) [2005] ECR i-06263, paragraphs 5 and 8, which, in that context, refer to solidarity, the relationship to loyalty of which is examined in Chapter 2. The link between loyalty and Article 4(2) TEU was also established in the Lisbon judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG). In that judgment, which I shall also refer to in Chapter 11, the BVerfG examined, inter alia, `whether the fundamental inviolable content of the constitutional identity of the Basic Law … 83 If Germany were to become a `constituent State of a European federal State`, that would amount to a change of identity of Germany and a `loss of State`.84 This follows from the `principle of respect for European law in the Fundamental Law` and therefore does not contradict the principle of sincere cooperation set out in Article 4(3) TEU. In the absence of such review, according to the BVerfG, `the fundamental political and constitutional structures of the sovereign Member States recognised in Article 4(2) TEU` cannot be guaranteed.85 As has been argued, the principles enshrined in Articles 4(2) and 4(3) TEU are fundamentally opposed. If their application were to be square, I would say that, on the one hand, it cannot be the task of a national (constitutional) court and, on the other hand, cannot concern the control of the provisions of an EU treaty. On the one hand, because if someone were entitled to examine the complaint alleging infringement of Article 4(2) TEU, it would have to be the ECJ and not the respective national constitutional courts.86 This could result from a request for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of Article 4(2) TEU by national constitutional courts such as the BVerfG.87 Secondly, if Article 4(2) TEU were applicable: For example, in the case of an application for annulment, it should refer to secondary EU law, but not as a standard of review of the provisions of another EU Treaty, as the BVerfG did.

Another more complicated example of loyalty obligations that apply to relations between Member States is mutual recognition. This principle obliges Member States to take account of regulatory decisions of other Member States with a view to promoting the common market.95 Directive 2005/36 on professional qualifications enshrines this principle for established and non-established professionals.96 The fifth recital in the preamble to the previous Directive confirmed the link between loyalty and mutual recognition of diplomas. Member States would infringe the former Article 5 EC if they required a national of a Member State to produce diplomas awarded under the Member State`s own education systems, where that person had already obtained all or part of those qualifications in another Member State. Article 13(2) TEU therefore expressly requires institutions to: show loyalty in the exercise of their powers. in the same language as in Article 4(3) TEU on the reciprocal obligations of the Member States and the institutions of the European Union. Another similarity with Article 4(3) TEU is the principle of conferral referred to in both provisions. Under Article 351(2) TFEU, Member States may be required to renegotiate or even terminate their Treaties which entered into force before 1 January 1958 or before the date of accession of a Member State.49 This may imply that Member States would have to amend the respective Treaty in order to allow its conclusion by the Union.50 This role of Article 351 TFEU has been defined as an application of the general obligation. set out in Article 351 TFEU: Cooperation. 4(3) TEU.51 By institutional loyalty, I mean the duty of loyalty which apply between different institutions of the Union. This is now explicitly stated in the above-mentioned Article 13(2) TEU.137 I would say that loyalty in this constellation is manifested in all variations of the principle of institutional balance. On the other hand, it has been argued that any breach of institutional loyalty under Article 13(2) TEU should be remedied by applying the principle of proportionality.138 However, it seems doubtful whether a balancing of interests by the institutions can be achieved by choosing between several envisaged measures.

The loyalty set out in Article 4(3) TEU is subsidiary to more specific provisions of the Treaty. In 1993, the Court held that the former Article 5 of the EEC Treaty `is formulated in such a general way that there can be no question of its autonomous application where the situation in question is governed by a specific provision of the Treaty …`. 3 TEU as regards an infringement of the competence of the European Union, in the case of exclusive competence, any reference to the former Article. 10 EC `a mere logical conclusion`.27 Thus, the Court has adopted this nature of lex specialis as regards the former Art. 43 EC (now Article 49 TFEU) and the obligation of mutual recognition.28 It has been argued that Article 106(1) TFEU expresses a specific obligation concerning public undertakings and undertakings to which The Member States grant special or exclusive rights. of loyalty to States, i.e. the interventionist and cooperative aspects of loyalty are reflected in the treaties. What is not reflected in the loyalty clause itself or in its specifications is the integrationist character of loyalty. This has been invoked exclusively by the Court of Justice of the European Communities and is dealt with, inter alia, in Chapter 3. It has been argued that mutual recognition would require all actors to take due account of the legitimate interests of others in the exercise of their own competences and functions, and that loyalty “would include the message that the EU legal system can only be autonomous to the extent that it is accepted or mutually recognised by other legal systems”.98 that there is a broad or narrow understanding of mutual recognition in this context.

Article 325 TFEU requires the Union and the Member States to take measures against fraud and other illegal activities affecting the financial interests of the Union. It can be understood as a specification of loyalty in two different ways. Article 325(3) TFEU requires Member States to `coordinate their action to protect the financial interests of the Union against fraud. To that end, they shall organise, together with the Commission, close and regular cooperation between the competent authorities. ».